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IntroductIon
Transitional justice (TJ) can be defined as the “full range 
of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice 
and achieve reconciliation.1 These may include both 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms […] individual 
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional 
reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.” 
(UN Secretary-General, 2004.) From this definition, the 
‘justice’ element is clear in terms of the crimes to which 
it is directed (mass repression, civil war, genocide etc., 
though there is increasing emphasis on socio-economic 
and gender-based crimes), while the mechanisms used 
have become commonplace (trials, truth commissions, 
purges, restorative local justice mechanisms, etc). Over 
time, the concept of TJ has been reframed in an expanding 
ArtIcLE
Transitional Justice’s Expanding 







Transitional justice studies increasingly apply to processes of truth, restoration and accountability in contexts far removed 
from the paradigmatic transitions from authoritarianism or war to relatively liberal democracy on which the field was 
initially based. At a time when transitional justice is being evaluated with greater stringency, it is worrying that assessments 
of its worth might be unduly coloured by reliance on non-transitional circumstances of established democracies or 
ongoing conflicts or authoritarianism. A systematic empirical understanding of the value of transitional justice is skewed 
when undue weight is given to mechanisms applied in favourable contexts. This may be where political or economic 
circumstances are so advanced that the mechanisms have little causal significance to an ongoing process of political, civil 
and (possibly) economic reform, or in contexts too inimical to anything approaching a liberalising or peace-building 
conclusion (e.g. when it takes place while war is ongoing or within an authoritarian regime). The article accepts that 
transitional justice mechanisms can be used to improve conditions under authoritarianism or war and can augment the 
rule of law, development and human rights in states that are already committed to liberal democracy. However, its impact 
in these non-paradigmatic circumstances will be limited because of the weakness of the state’s commitment to improving 
societal conditions in the former and the pre-existing strength of the commitment in the latter. It argues that there is a 
distinction between transitional justice and the use of transitional justice mechanisms.
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1 The author is grateful for the reviewer’s comments which helped considerably in tightening up the argument.
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literature (Teitel, 2003; Roht-Arriaza, 2006, Bell, 2009) 
to include agendas that were disregarded in its earliest 
days, most notably restorative justice, which followed the 
recognition that intimate violence may require intimate 
forms of justice, and that community-level conflict 
requires community-level solutions (Gready, 2005, p. 14). 
As applied concepts of justice expand, TJ has become a 
complex of inquiries incorporating development studies, 
economics, semiotics, anthropology, political science and 
many other disciplines. The debate has shifted from one 
centred on competing institutions to a holistic approach 
incorporating diverse mechanisms and values without a 
clear normative hierarchy. This diversification has been 
in response to the variety of contexts where human rights, 
broadly understood, have been denied and replaced by the 
supposedly one-size-fits-all approaches that marked the 
truth versus justice era of the 1990s. 
The expansion of the conception of justice, while com-
mendable, has placed some strain on the conception of 
what is ‘transitional’. This element of the field has always 
been somewhat elusive, its very liminality making it ad-
verse to precise definition. The scope of TJ has always been 
contested spatially in terms of geographical area and type 
of injustice. As the mechanisms and contexts it applies to 
proliferate, it is also contested temporally, to the degree 
that to label certain processes ‘transitional’ risks concep-
tual incoherence. The focus on crimes of the past opens up 
the possibility of retrospective accountability in the demo-
cratic future far beyond a point which can truly be said to 
be transitional or, at the other end of the spectrum, imme-
diate accountability for crimes of the past before a transi-
tion is reached or even in view. Of course, one can argue 
that this is merely a semantic point and that ‘transitional 
justice’ has perhaps outgrown its composite words and no 
longer simply refers to justice during transition, but rather 
to processes aimed at dealing with the past generally. Ter-
minological inconsistency, it might be argued, should not 
concern us if the concept of TJ provides a platform and ral-
lying point for positive action in redressing past injustices 
of all types, and can be adjusted to cope with the infinite 
variation of transitional exigencies. That the expansion of 
TJ has occurred in response to pressing necessities and 
blind spots is beyond question. However, at a time when 
scholars, activists and (perhaps most importantly) funding 
agencies increasingly question whether TJ can actually jus-
tify claims of being able to satisfy those necessities, there 
may be some advantage in re-examining the elasticity in 
the conception of transition catalysed by the wider scope 
of justice.
After a period of rapid growth, scholars are now at-
tempting to systematise what has been published about the 
causal relationships between TJ and its overarching aspira-
tions (peace, democracy, socio-economic justice, human 
rights, rule of law) and the micro-goals which contribute 
to them (retribution, restoration, redistribution, deter-
rence, reconciliation, social pedagogy). The literature has 
been dominated by anecdote, analogy and hypothesis, and 
it is assumed that more solid empirical research will be able 
to substantiate claims of how well TJ can achieve the am-
bitions ascribed to it (Kritz, 2009, p. 16; Olsen, Payne & 
Reiter, 2010, p. 4). However, as Lutz (2006, p. 339) notes, 
there are so many independent variables in a transition 
process that it is hard to isolate the role of accountability 
or restorative justice measures. The nature of the transition 
itself differs. This is in terms of the old regime or conflict 
(authoritarian, civil war, authoritarian civil war, demo-
cratic civil war, a regime of criminals or a criminal regime, 
secession or ethnic conflict,) and the new regime (strongly 
democratic, weakly democratic, pseudo–democratic, par-
ticipation or exclusion of old regime). It also depends on 
the way transition arrived (negotiation, victory); the scale 
and duration of past crimes (number of victims, years of 
war/repression); the history of the state (autocracy and war 
are anomalous or commonplace); the autonomy of law; 
and political economy (institutions of governance, politi-
cal environment, and economic wealth and distribution). 
It matters significantly what a given transition is from as 
well as what it is to, when the time comes to evaluate TJ. 
It is important, therefore, to clarify which types of TJ 
mechanisms can have the biggest impact on and for which 
it has little hope of success, given the numerous variables 
a change in political regime incorporates. Simply put, a 
systematic empirical understanding of the value of TJ is 
skewed when undue weight is given to processes applied 
in two different contexts. This may be when the situation 
is too favourable to a positive outcome, for example, while 
accountability that occurs long after successful political 
transition is much easier it is also less likely to have a sig-
nificant bearing on the direction of the state. Alternatively, 
the situation may be too inimical to anything approaching 
a liberalising or peace-building conclusion, such as when 
TJ mechanisms are applied while war is ongoing or within 
an authoritarian regime. This article questions whether a 
process should be called TJ or judged as such simply be-
cause it aims to deal with the past generally, to draw a line 
though what may be distant history, or pursue a peace 
which has no prospect of emerging. It criticises the per-
sistent and increasing emphasis in studies on the use of TJ 
mechanisms in societies which radically depart from the 
traditional type of transitions where it is most useful. 
There is an easily recognisable, but frequently ignored, 
distinction between TJ and the use of what are generally re-
garded as the mechanisms. While this article accepts that 
TJ mechanisms can be used to improve conditions during 
authoritarianism or war, the overall impact of TJ in these 
non-paradigmatic circumstances will be limited because of 
the weakness of the state’s commitment to human rights and 
the rule of law in the former, and the pre-existing strength 
of the commitment in the latter. What may be left in these 
non-paradigmatic transitions are a series of discrete micro-
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projects which are so far removed from, and causally insig-
nificant in, any macro process of changing from one type of 
society to another, that to label them ‘transitional’ is both 
contrived and unhelpful in wider debates on the phenome-
non. This is not to say that they are not beneficial to their tar-
get communities. However, it has become too easy for critics 
to undermine TJ as a whole by pointing to the relatively pal-
try nature of the output of projects in contexts where there 
are no other national processes of large-scale socio-political 
transformation. Similarly, it is too easy for advocates to jus-
tify TJ generally with reference to projects which blossom 
in states where already consolidated peace and democracy 
are highly propitious for any type of social project. In mere-
ly augmenting an existent regime rule of law and human 
rights, the incorporation of TJ at the tail end of a narrative 
of success signals socio-political advances made elsewhere 
rather than its inherent utility. Somewhere in-between is the 
battleground on which the debate on the general usability of 
TJ should occur, between its advocates and detractors. This 
territory is the paradigmatic transition.
Part I outlines what we consider the paradigmatic 
transition, part II examines the application of TJ to con-
texts far removed from these conditions, and part III out-
lines why the success or failure in mediating paradigmatic 
transition is the most pertinent factor in judging the worth 
of transitional accountability.
PArt I: thE PArAdIgmAtIc 
trAnsItIon
Transition defies comprehensive definition. While the 
word connotes change, and within the present context 
clearly connotes political transformation, change is 
endemic in politics: resisting it, debating it or contesting 
the degree of change needed (Du Bois and Czarnota, 1999, 
p. 9). Transition can be negative, for example the pluralist 
republics of the former Yugoslavia becoming ethnically 
exclusionary entities or Haiti’s recurrent shifts from 
democracy to anarchy. Roht-Arriaza (2002, p. 1) has argued 
that the term ‘transitional’ has always been slippery because 
TJ debates have never clearly articulated what the state is 
transitioning to. She may overstate the case - the initial 
conception of transition in TJ was one which emerged from 
political science studies of the Southern Cone, such as that 
of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) who focussed on elite 
models of transition which brings agency and choice to the 
foreground. Here, transition was conceived as the interval 
between two regimes without necessarily incorporating 
a normative democratic direction. This in itself is quite a 
broad and mutable concept. Eventually, definitions of 
transition adopted in the literature adapted this paradigm 
to concentrate on transition of a regime to democratic, 
peaceful, rights-respecting polities. For example, Henkin 
(1989, p. 1) argued that discussions on TJ arise “when a 
government that has engaged in gross violations of human 
rights is succeeded by a regime more inclined to respect 
those rights.” Teitel used the term transition to cover 
“the move from less to more democratic regimes” (Teitel, 
2000, p. 5), while Smiley considered transition from 
a regime whose norms are bad to one whose norms are 
good (Smiley, 2001, p. 1336). Over time, the link to liberal 
democratic transition was questioned. For example, Lundy 
and McGovern (2008, p. 273) remind us that the assumed 
virtue of Western formulations of democracy can mask the 
fact that human rights abuses may continue in states where 
the norms of liberal democratic accountability prevail. 
Similarly, Nagy criticises the preoccupation with bringing 
illiberal regimes into the liberal scheme as this treats 
liberal democracies as benevolent models (Nagy, 2008). 
Admittedly, even a reasonably conception of democracy 
is but the tip of the democratic iceberg and can obscure 
any number of dangerous contingencies below the water 
line. However, the focus on transition to liberal democracy 
in the literature may be explained by its greater capacity 
to rectify such problems than competing constitutional 
models. 
Though there is a considerable degree of flexibility in 
such definitions, the paradigmatic transition was generally 
framed by two modes of transition, compact (understood 
as negotiated compromises between antagonists) or rup-
ture (understood as the overthrow or defeat of one side to 
a political or military conflict) (Ní Aoláin and Campbell, 
2005, p. 180). 
Two types of paradigmatic transition fit within this 
concept. The first, typical of the Latin American and East-
ern European transitions which spurred the development 
of TJ as a self-conscious policy-making process in the late 
1980s, is that of a non-democratic or authoritarian state 
moving to democracy. This type of transition has seen a 
recent revival with elective regime change in Tunisia, 
while, at the time of writing, it is unclear whether or to 
what degree Egypt will follow. While truth commissions 
and modern instantiations of the successor trial initially 
dealt with the problem of the legacy of authoritarian rule, 
a second paradigmatic transition became more common 
as the 1990s progressed from the wars in the Balkans and 
Great Lakes region to more recent transitions as in Cote 
d’Ivoire (and possibly Libya). Here, a state transitions from 
war or a prolonged period of structured political violence 
to a peace which reaffirms, modifies or creates democratic 
governance. Many changes will of course contain elements 
of the two paradigms. Most peace agreements provide for 
renewed or modified democratic measures, while most 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy attempt 
to place controls on military or non-military actors who 
could threaten violent conflict. 
Definitions of TJ that adopted this model, such as 
Teitel’s (2003, p. 69) interpretation of it as “the concep-
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tion of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdo-
ings of repressive predecessor regimes”, have fallen out of 
favour. Roht-Arriaza (2006, p. 1) argued that this defini-
tion is “problematic” in that it implies a defined period of 
flux after which a post-transitional state sets in, whereas 
in practice transition might span decades. This argument 
appears to have been accepted uncritically in the literature, 
but it should be questioned. There are periods when a state 
of war, autocracy or repression is on the wane or when the 
end may look inevitable, and there may be periods in de-
mocratisation where liberalising programmes have been 
consolidated but not finalised. However, to conceive of 
these as transitional requires degrees of mental deftness 
that conceptualise transition so elastically as to deny it any 
independent value. Transitions are still politically defined 
by pacts, agreements, elections, referenda, constitutions, 
and peace treaties. It may take decades of weakening in a 
war or autocracy to reach this point, or decades afterwards 
for the new polity to become fully consolidated, but it 
strains credibility to describe all of that period as genuinely 
transitional. The transition itself is a finite and contained 
phenomenon, with temporal limits at the undemocratic 
and democratic ends of the interregnum between regimes 
(indeed, much of the debate concerns how residual power 
of the old elite constrains what can be done). But, perhaps 
paradoxically, the field of what we call TJ has become di-
vorced from these moorings and appears to have no limits 
to its field of application.
The term ‘transition’ is now routinely applied to con-
texts where no such process is apparent. It is something 
conceived of as a natural and inevitable development in a 
globalised, “steady-state” phase of TJ, departing from the 
preoccupation with past violence to treat conditions of per-
sistent conflict, laying the foundation for a normalised law 
of violence where TJ has become commonplace as opposed 
to exceptional (Teitel, 2003, p. 89-93). It is worth ponder-
ing how natural and coherent this development is; it may 
owe more to the popularity of TJ as fashionable vocabulary 
for funding applications and academic attention than to 
any coherent correspondence between available human or 
institutional resources and a socio-political context. Given 
the boundless pliability of inherently ad hoc mechanisms 
like special tribunals, truth commissions, commissions of 
inquiry or lustration committees, it should come as no sur-
prise that they have been employed in human rights work 
in many different types of societies beyond the merely tran-
sitional. Another explanation for the use of TJ mechanisms 
in non-paradigmatic transitions is the laudable desire to 
include gender and structural issues, hitherto ignored due 
to the concentration in the 1980s and 90s on liberal legal-
ist issues in paradigmatic transitions (Mani, 2007, p. 151). 
However, this has gone a step further to the extent that 
mechanisms are now being used in states in the developing 
world where there has been little or no discernible political 
change or increased domestic willingness to tackle these is-
sues, attempting to initiate an economic transition instead 
of capitalising on a political one. There can be little doubt 
that TJ mechanisms are potentially of great use in human 
rights and developmental work such as justice issues. If any 
TJ mechanism improves human rights, broadly understood, 
making society fairer or more tolerant, it is to be welcomed. 
However, it is highly questionable whether it is in any way 
coherent or sensible to consider every truth commission, 
trial or purge as inherently transitional, if the state in which 
they occur has undergone no significant change, unless one 
accepts the bland assertion that “every society is in transi-
tion” (Kiss, 2000, p. 92). What makes TJ distinctive is not 
the value of its aims, but the fact that it occurs in times of 
heightened, epiphenomenal opportunity when a state is re-
evaluating or re-establishing the norms on which it is based. 
The significance of this essential liminality is being lost in 
an era where a “do everything, engage everyone” (Gready, 
2005, p. 7) ethos is paramount. 
In much TJ discourse, therefore, a highly tractable def-
inition of ‘transitional justice’ now includes accountability 
before a peace agreement is finalised (or even mooted): 
processes in long-established Western democracies to ad-
dress historic injustices against marginalised groups, pro-
cesses in non-democratic states where there is no regime 
change and mechanisms adopted when there is a significant 
change from one civil democratic government to another. 
As Bell (2009, p. 23) notes, “little attempt has been made to 
define a concept of transition that would place limitations 
on when transitional justice can legitimately be applied.” 
TJ no longer appears to require an observable period of lib-
eralising political change. This is troubling as the discipline 
reaches maturity and attempts are made to undertake more 
systematic and comparative analysis of its record in order 
to move away from the faith-based discussions which have 
dominated the debate to more measured, fact-based ones 
(Thoms, Ron and Paris, 2010, p. 329). As Schauer (2003, pp. 
12-13) points out, “there is always a risk that, by defining 
the problem [of transition] so broadly, we lose a crisp sense 
of what the problem is and where it has its most significant 
bite.” It is necessary therefore to clarify the types of transition 
in which TJ mechanisms are employed. It should be borne in 
mind that they may be used in contexts whose dilemmas (if 
indeed there are any) are radically different in material terms 
from the type of situations addressed in earlier debates, such 
as the peace-versus-justice or truth-versus-trial issues which 
dominated the topic in earlier times. 
First, however, it is necessary to look at the applica-
tion of TJ mechanisms in four areas that depart from the 
democratic/post-conflict transition paradigm, namely TJ 
in mature democracies and in civil-civil transitions at the 
more permissive end of the spectrum, and in authoritarian 
regimes and ongoing conflicts at the more restrictive end. 
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PArt II: A tyPoLogy of  
QuAsI-trAnsItIonAL JustIcE
a) transitional Justice in mature 
democracies
TJ mechanisms have ceased to be applied solely to 
post-authoritarian regimes or post-conflict situations. 
Truth commissions, restoration projects, historical 
inquiries and trials are increasingly employed in mature 
democracies attempting to repair instances of past 
abrogation of the universalistic ideas on which they claim 
legitimacy (Torpey, 2003, p. 9). These are used long after 
the democracy has been established and consolidated, 
but are nevertheless referred to as instances of TJ. For 
example, the German government has apologised and 
paid money to Namibians for the Herero genocide in 
the first decade of the last century (Huyse, 2009, p. 34). 
In the United States, the Greensboro Truth Commission 
and reparations processes for Japanese-American 
internees are further instances of historical justice viewed 
through the transition lens (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010, 
p. 2). The International Center for Transitional Justice 
(2008, p. 1) reports on the settlement package awarded 
by the Canadian Government to the estimated 80,000 
survivors of the indigenous children forcibly assimilated 
in church-run Indian Residential Schools and the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission whose mandate was to 
investigate it. 
These processes do valuable work and constitute an 
appropriate response to earlier arguments that a bet-
ter understanding of reparation politics would consider 
crimes committed by liberal regimes as well as authoritar-
ian ones. Responding to the treatment of aborigines (Rat-
ner, Carroll and Woolford, 2003), damage the slave trade 
did to Africa (Conley, 2003) or restitution of art stolen 
by the Nazis (O’ Donnell, 2011) may be what Olick and 
Coughlin (2003, pp. 49-50) call “responsible politics of 
regret” or what De Brito et al (2001, p. 1) call “the politics 
of memory”. However, these situations are far removed 
from that of a paradigmatic transition. The TJ mecha-
nisms, designed for post-authoritarian and post-conflict 
situations, perform the standard functions of legitima-
tion and national reconciliation because they enjoy the 
full weight of an industrialised liberal state and there are 
decades between the wrongdoing and the application of 
TJ. The problems they face, however, are less intractable, 
and the political context less volatile, than the transitions 
that characterised the field in the rush of post Cold-War 
democratisation and the wars of the 1990s. Dramatic fail-
ure, or indeed complete success, of these processes will 
have almost no bearing on the functioning of domestic 
polity.
b) transitional Justice in civil-civil 
transitions
A notable recent development is the extension of TJ to 
instances of quasi-transition from a civil government where 
human rights violations occurred to another where this is 
less likely to occur. Prime examples include the change in 
Mexico, in 2000, from decades of PRI hegemony to greater 
political openness (Seils, 2004) and the civil-civil transition 
in Nigeria in 2007 (Yusuf, 2010, p. 92). These are analogous 
to transitions in long-established ‘conflicted democracies’ 
which experience prolonged political violence from deep-
seated societal division, the paradigmatic example being 
Northern Ireland. While only South Africa has attracted 
more TJ studies than Northern Ireland, Ní Aoláin and 
Campbell note that the imperative in such societies is to 
reform rather than transform, although the typology will 
depend on how far the state was compromised during 
the violence and how far it has gone to acknowledge it 
(Ní Aoláin and Campbell, 2005, p. 187). These quasi-
transitions are radically different from the paradigmatic 
transition from which the field emerged: given that there 
is usually significant public acceptance of the government 
and the rule of law, human rights abuses are considered 
exceptional long before political change and there is little 
incentive to further dismantle or reconstruct the state 
(Ní Aoláin and Campbell, 2005, p. 188). Again, the problems 
faced are less intractable, and the political context less volatile, 
than in the paradigmatic transition, begging the questions of 
whether they are reforming or transitioning, and whether 
it is worthwhile maintaining a distinction between the two.
c) transitional Justice in ongoing 
Conflicts
As noted above, one of the two paradigmatic transitions 
in the literature are state transitions from war or from a 
prolonged period of mass, organised political violence to 
peace. There is no problem in applying the paradigm in 
cases like Sierra Leone’s Special Court, Kosovo’s Regulation 
64 Panels and East Timor’s Special Panels, which were 
established after the guns went silent, and likewise to 
ongoing or mooted Arab trials of figures from the Gaddafi, 
Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes after their removal. However, 
the first and probably most examined instance of this TJ 
genus, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), was established when there was no 
transition to speak of. Established in May 1993, the Tribunal 
preceded the Dayton accords which established the Office 
of the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, by 
three-and-a-half years and the removal of Milosevic from 
power by six (UN Security Council 1993). Teitel (2005a, p. 
291) notes that, after the Cold War era, TJ institutions were 
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not necessarily developed in the aftermath of conflicts 
alone, but as part of a process of resolving ongoing 
conflicts. However, this position elides the extent to which 
accountability to the ICTY jeopardised the resolution 
of the conflict at Dayton (Mégret 2002, p. 1278), proved 
ineffective in preventing the later Kosovo war and boosted 
the electoral prospects of revanchist candidates (Sloan, 
2007, p. 88; Subotic, 2007, pp. 370, esp. footnote 35). On a 
similar line, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo (2007, pp. 8-9) argues 
that:
“The International Criminal Court is part of the 
transitional justice project because it aims to confront 
centuries-old methods of behaviour – those of conflict 
and war, the abuse of civilians, woman and children 
– and to reshape the norms of human conduct while 
violence is still ongoing, thus aiming, as stated in the 
Rome Statute, to contribute to the prevention of future 
crimes.” 
However, if one looks at where the ICC is active, most 
notably Sudan and Libya, at the time he commenced his ac-
tivities there was no certainty of transition or even a peace 
agreement. Many argue that the investigations in Uganda 
are hampering peace (Apuuli, 2006; Branch, 2007), but the 
very existence of a debate demonstrates how far the state 
is from anything resembling peace or transition. The fail-
ure of the Bashir indictment and the death threats against 
witnesses in DRC proceedings demonstrate (Kerr and 
Mobekk, 2007, p. 120) that these processes face even more 
problems than the paradigmatic transition, as they lack the 
opportunity for accountability that the victor’s justice or a 
solid peace-settlement would allow (Teitel, 2005b, p. 858). 
Certainly, the gathering of documentation and evidence 
can and should start before the end of violence. However, 
given the possibility that a Bashir, Gaddafi or a Kony might 
have ultimately emerged victorious at the time of indict-
ment, it strains credibility and consistency to describe 
these activities as in any way transitional. 
Much like the use of truth commissions and histori-
cal justice in mature democracies combine TJ with politics 
of regret, the use of TJ mechanisms in ongoing conflicts 
(at least to the extent that it is intended to help resolve the 
conflict) is better characterised as a type of conflict trans-
formation. Conflict transformation is a “process of engag-
ing with and transforming the relationships, interests, dis-
courses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society 
that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall, 
2004, p. 4). It involves transforming the relationships that 
support violence, implicitly acknowledging the violence is 
potentially long-term instead of presupposing its termina-
tion (Fischer, Giessmann and Schmelze, 2004; Lederach, 
2003). This fits better with the potential for a tribunal like 
the ICTY to stigmatise and physically contain antagonists 
(Akhavan, 2009) while avoiding the theoretic artfulness 
inherent in perceiving these actions as transitional. The 
position of amnesty in peace agreements or pacts has long 
been debated in TJ, but pre-peace talk amnesties intro-
duced before such agreements, to reduce the number of 
combatants in a conflict transformation or to bring parties 
to the negotiating table at the end of authoritarian rule in 
Uruguay, Brazil and South Africa, have long been accepted 
as the “carrot” in conflict transformation. Trials and truth 
commissions before peace (or even the prospect of peace) 
are better seen as a conflict transformation “stick” than us-
ing tortured (and possible illusory) logic to label it tran-
sitional. Similarly, in Columbia, the 2005 Ley de Justicia y 
Paz proposed effective amnesty for the right-wing para-
military group United Self-Defence Forces for beginning, 
as opposed to concluding, a peace process. It has been 
challenged by human rights commentators and politicians 
who rejected President Uribe’s presentation of legislation 
as restorative TJ (Diaz, 2008). By linking demobilisation to 
pardon and reduced prison sentences, it is a clear instance 
of attempted conflict transformation in a situation where 
meaningful political change is as far away as ever. TJ is a 
form of peacebuilding in transition, not a form of peace-
making long before it.
d) transitional Justice in Authoritarian 
regimes
In the early days of TJ discourse, Cohen (1995, p. 41) argued 
that the “forget the past” rhetoric used by the old regime 
when handing over power to liberalising agents constituted 
“an attempt to avoid accountability by using liberal slogans 
in bad faith.” The last twenty years have also seen regimes 
tactically adopt the liberal antithesis of “forget the past”, 
namely TJ, in situations (a) where the transition is from 
one form of authoritarianism to another, and (b) where 
there is no transition but an authoritarian regime adopts 
mechanisms of TJ without simultaneously undergoing a 
process of political reform. Regarding the former category, 
a prime example is the truth commission established by 
Chad’s new President Idriss Déby to expose the venality 
of the previous Hissene Habré regime and to bolster the 
standing of the new government, while he relied on the 
same violent tactics and personnel during his rule (Snyder 
and Vinjamuri, 2003/4, p. 33). Yoweri Museveni’s truth 
commission in Uganda, in 1986, similarly maintained 
the façade of liberal accountability in the service of 
legitimising an undemocratic regime (Quinn, 2004). 
Probably the most comprehensive attempts at transitional 
accountability ever have occurred in Rwanda and Ethiopia 
where there have been thousands of trials of genocidaires 
and the Derg respectively. In both countries, domestic 
trials were used as “a political tool in order to try to create 
a decisive breach with the past and the old political order, 
Pádraig McAuliffe   Transitional Justice’s Expanding Empire: Reasserting…      http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu
E-journal promoted by the Campus for Peace, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
JOURNAL OF CONFLICTOLOGY,  Volume 2, Issue 2 (2011)        ISSN 2013-8857    38
concomitantly giving legitimacy to this new system of 
governance” (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 85). Both sets of domestic 
trials have been criticised for shortcomings in their human 
rights records, but the fault must lie far more in the failure 
of the majority Kagame and Zenawi regimes to undertake 
genuinely liberal transition than the inquiries, trials and TJ 
mechanisms (Longman, 2011, Pausewang, 2004). Though 
academics are content to consider these episodes within 
the canon of TJ even where they criticise them, in the 
interest of consistency and clarity perhaps the argument 
of De Brito et al (2001, p. 11) is more suited to reasoned 
appraisal of the merits and demerits of TJ generally:
“By ‘transition’ is meant the shift from a non-democratic 
regime type to a democratic one, not merely a change 
of government or a process of liberalisation within an 
authoritarian regime.” 
This is a useful definition to bear in mind in a new 
normative milieu where normalised and globalised TJ may 
confer a hollow legitimacy to the exercise of power. Com-
promised TJ in ostensibly democratic transitional regimes 
that retain autocratic features may testify to the precari-
ous nature of their liberalisation, most notably Cambodia’s 
hybrid Extraordinary Chambers and Indonesia’s ad hoc 
tribunals, which have served in large part to shield their 
current ruling party and military, respectively, from ac-
countability (McAuliffe, 2010; Cohen, 2003). 
III. thE PArAdIgmAtIc 
trAnsItIon rEvIsItEd
Unlike decolonisation or the radical metamorphosis of 
the French or Russian Revolutions, modern transitions 
are rarely revolutionary, in the sense of a substantial 
displacement in a short space of time of existing political 
and economic structures, or a psychology which imagines 
a novel culture whose traditions and history are largely 
being made anew (Schauer, 2003, p. 12). Societies can 
rarely completely remake themselves and there will be 
greater continuity than those at the vanguard of change 
would like – geography, language and ethnicity will usually 
remain constant, while the endurance of the peace versus 
stability debate testifies to the unlikelihood of entirely 
eradicating the previous regime or removing a defeated 
antagonist. In a transition, on the other hand, the state 
makes organisational, systemic changes in the functioning 
of the polity, but it is in many respects a more superficial 
process. The motivation for the change may not be the 
result of widespread rejection of the regime, but something 
altogether more desultory and shallow. For example, 
the Argentine Junta was prosecuted less because of the 
thousands of deaths in the internal Dirty War, but rather 
because they lost the Falklands conflict (Zalaquett, 1992, 
p. 1428). 
In many pacted transitions from authoritarian rule, it 
is possible to identify a key transitional moment such as the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the resignation of Mubarak or the 
release of Mandela (Teitel, 1997, p. 2021; Mendez, 2007, p. 
482). Given that positive change is an incremental process, 
one can point to more complex, multistage transitions like 
the fall of Salazar in Portugal or democratisation in Serbia, 
but there will be an identifiable tipping point where transi-
tion can be said to have become irreversible. Even if there 
is no ‘big bang’ at the start and the final point in democrat-
ic consolidation is years or even decades away (Ní Aoláin 
and Campbell, 2005, pp. 209 & 213). Transition after war 
will rarely subvert previous political arrangements even 
when the previous regime is defeated. Peace agreements, 
generally, do not outline in detail the precise form of insti-
tutional change required but merely pronounce the need 
for change and delineate the targeted institutions (Bell, 
2000, p. 182). As Ní Aoláin and Campbell (2005, p. 182) 
put it, the paradigmatic transition “sees itself as a process 
of closure... There is typically a ‘deal’ followed by a period 
of constitutional and institutional change”, at which point 
transition ends. These moments are “superficial legal rup-
tures,” more in the nature of turning points in the nation’s 
history where values are reconsidered and revised rather 
than complete transformation (Osiel, 1997, pp. 27 & 166). 
Transition tends to be uniform throughout the state, 
a natural by-product of the uniformity of prior authori-
tarian rule or the national basis of peace agreements, 
and rarely attracts widespread resistance once neces-
sary change in the political order begins (Ní Aoláin and 
Campbell, 2005, pp. 180 & 182). It should as a preliminary 
matter be clarified that the paradigmatic transition does 
not include transition to Isaiah Berlin’s “liberal-minded 
despot[ism]” where the new regime may be “unjust... en-
courage the wildest inequalities, care little for order, or vir-
tue, or knowledge” but leaves the citizenry “a wide area 
of liberty... or at least curb it less than other regimes.” 
(Berlin, 1969, p. 129). De Greiff (2011, p. 23) is correct 
to argue that transitional redress instigated by this polity 
against its predecessor should be considered progress, but 
equally notes that it can easily be derailed. Even where it 
is not, even the most benign autocratic regime is too far 
removed from the normative foundations of peacebuild-
ing in the UN Charter and the pillars of the modern in-
ternational legal system, most notably in areas of human 
rights law, humanitarian law and criminal law, to con-
stitute an environment conducive to productive interac-
tions of TJ and rule of law reform (UN Secretary-General, 
2004, para.9). 
Falling short of revolution, transition can range from 
the radical to the conservative, and accountability meas-
ures here can have a significant effect on this transforma-
tion, for better or for worse. The paradigmatic, or genu-
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ine, transitions by which the phenomenon of TJ should be 
judged are located on a sliding scale of democracy, from 
merely procedural to fully substantive, but at either end 
of the scale, justice initiatives will be of limited utility on 
a macro-level, even if there are beneficial, discreet micro-
level projects. A Schumpeterian notion of transition to 
democracy, defined as one where “individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote”, is a useful starting point (Schumpeter, 1950, 
p. 269). On the conservative end of the scale is a transition 
to a state meeting the minimum requirements of a pro-
cedural democracy based on majoritarian principles, but 
which lacks the substance of liberal democracy. It may not 
enjoy the consent of significant minorities, it may repress 
them, or have little commitment to the rule of law or to hu-
man rights. Osiel (1994, p. 44) argues against the ‘fashion-
able’ disparagement of the procedural republic, contending 
that it is significantly better than the fratricide which may 
have typified the preceding regime, but such a context is 
unlikely to yield a genuine, sustained effort to pursue TJ, 
rule of law reconstruction, reconciliation etc. For example, 
throughout the 1990s, the military asserted control over 
elected civilian governments in Guatemala, Haiti, El Salva-
dor and the Philippines. Honduras became a democracy in 
1982, but the military enjoyed effective control over policy 
for another decade (Leonard, 2010, pp. 156-166; Hayner, 
2001, pp. 64-66). 
In merely nominally democratic societies, the revan-
chist or illiberal forces can occupy a large realm of autono-
mous power and exert more power over the civilian govern-
ment than the government over them. In such situations TJ 
is severely limited in any case, but such situations must be 
distinguished from cases such as Argentina or the Eastern 
Bloc republics, where the government is not immune from 
instability that accountability might occasion, but still re-
tains functional authority. Though the previous regime will 
often attempt to maintain some power, situations where 
spoilers can destabilise a reasonably settled government 
must be distinguished from procedurally democratic re-
gimes still effectively controlled by revanchist or undemo-
cratic elements. In even the shakiest of transitions to liberal 
democracy, fruitful interaction of rule of law reconstruc-
tion, reconciliation and development with TJ (however 
limited) is possible if the government has at least a minimal 
commitment to these ends. The failure or success of TJ to 
complement, assist or even define the liberalisation process 
in such contexts is something it can fairly be judged on. On 
the other hand, TJ mechanisms should not be criticised for 
their lack of impact on democratisation, human rights or 
the rule of law at the other end of the transformative scale. 
In states like Rwanda, the DR Congo or Ethiopia, where 
victorious armies with little commitment to human rights 
take power (with or without electoral assent), Cambodia, 
where elections are rigged (St. John, 2005) or Indonesia, 
where the army retains significant influence (Schneier, 
2009), the political climate is not conducive to the wider 
social legacy of trials or truth commissions.
Conscious of these limitations, TJ literature moved 
away from a Schumpeterian definition based primarily 
on elections, towards a broader normative idea incorpo-
rating liberal institutions and commitments, most notably 
the rule of law (Teitel, 2000, p. 5). The ideal transitional 
democracy is a liberal, fully constitutional polity where 
governments are elected by a majority and with a rule of 
law that serves to protect minorities, but, arguably, the only 
instances of such a transition in a single jump are East Ger-
many’s subsumption into the German Federal Republic 
and Northern Ireland’s enduring existence within the UK. 
TJ and rule of law reconstruction can usefully be integrated 
in such conditions, but the macro-level contribution of this 
interaction will rarely determine the success of transition 
as it might in some weaker states, for the simple reason 
that the state already delivers human rights, democracy 
and rule of law. In the former category of cases, positive 
reform can successfully proceed independently of TJ and 
vice-versa. 
Transitions like those in East Germany and Northern 
Ireland are hardly typical. A more representative transition 
is one to a state which rules with the consent of the people 
through free and fair elections, with a monopoly on the 
use of legitimate force and a commitment to human rights. 
This is where TJ might have a significant bearing on the 
success or failure of political reform and rule of law trans-
formation, even if this democracy falls some way short of 
popular engagement with politics, is not fully free of ter-
rorism or violence and even if the commitment to human 
rights lacks full compliance by all public and private actors. 
Though limited, this type of democracy goes beyond what 
Bhargava (2000) labels “minimally decent” societies which 
merely avoid relapse into past atrocities. Semi-stable dem-
ocratic transitions like those in Bosnia, East Timor, South 
Africa, Tunisia and Cote d’Ivoire obviously fit within this 
schema. However, as Bell (2009, p. 25) reminds us, transi-
tion is not the same as post-conflict, but merely constitutes 
a post-settlement phase where violence is translated into 
a set of political and legal holding devices that enable old 
disputes to take place less violently. It is always somewhat 
precarious – even the clearest transitional political ar-
rangements and mechanisms will not automatically bring 
peace, security or end human rights violations; passionate 
disagreement over politics may exist even within demo-
cratic institutions. As the UN Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice Report puts it:
“And yet, helping war-torn societies re-establish the 
rule of law and come to terms with large-scale past 
abuses, all within a context marked by devastated 
institutions, exhausted resources, diminished security 
and a traumatised and divided population, is a daunting, 
often overwhelming, task. It requires attention to 
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myriad deficits, among which are a lack of political will 
for reform, a lack of institutional independence within 
the justice sector, a lack of domestic technical capacity, a 
lack of material and financial resources, a lack of public 
confidence in Government, a lack of official respect for 
human rights and, more generally, a lack of peace and 
security.” (UN Secretary-General, 2004, para.3).
Even countries labelled “post-conflict” manifest great 
insecurity and volatility, while problems will also persist in 
authoritarian handovers to liberal opposition. Carothers 
(2002, p. 17-18) even advocates the removal of the “tran-
sition lens” in such contexts, arguing that it does more to 
confuse analysis of policy than to clarify it, by presuming 
a democratic outcome. He argues that those interested in 
democratisation:
“should start by assuming that what is often thought 
of as an uneasy, precarious middle ground between 
full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is 
actually the most common political condition today 
of the countries in the developing world and the post-
communist world. It is not an exceptional category... it 
is a state of normality for many societies”
Nevertheless, rule of law reformers and TJ actors are 
justified in being more ambitious than Carothers in believ-
ing their activities can make a firm contribution to moving 
beyond the circumstances. As such, the potential of TJ to 
effect or catalyse positive change is best judged in relatively 
shaky transitions in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire and 
Iraq, despite their persistent insecurity. Success or failure 
in such circumstances will say much for transition justice’s 
liberalising and rule of law-affirming potential, because 
the political context in which they operate does not make 
their accomplishment or frustration foregone conclusions. 
By comparison, TJ mechanisms may be applied in situa-
tions where any potentially positive legacy will be so over-
shadowed by political instability as to be of limited utility. 
Notable examples include states which move to democracy 
and undertake TJ but remain embroiled in war, such as 
Sri Lanka after the Kumaratunga election in 1994 (Sriram, 
2002), or the complicit mass human rights abuses that took 
place in Indonesia in Aceh and West Papua (International 
Center for Transitional Justice & KontraS, 2011).
concLusIon
The tendency to include TJ mechanisms employed in long-
consolidated or deeply unstable/authoritarian states under 
the rubric of TJ obscures its value in achieving various macro-
aspirations (peace, democracy, human rights, development, 
rule of law) and the micro-goals which contribute to them 
(retribution, deterrence, reconciliation, social pedagogy). 
In the proposed situations, the mechanisms are almost 
irrelevant due to pre-existing conditions favourable to 
positive outcomes, or ongoing war or the balance of illiberal 
power are too inimical to their success. When evaluating TJ 
as a general phenomenon, both its advocates and detractors 
draw the most relevant conclusions primarily from the 
paradigmatic transition from authoritarianism or war to 
democracy because it is here that it has the greatest potential 
and is most needed to catalyse change. Unlike TJ in mature 
democracies or civil-civil transitions, transitional politics 
is open-ended in a way that steady-state politics is not. As 
DuBois and Czarnota (1999, p. 9) put it:
“Whereas ordinary politics, even ordinary politics 
about politics, takes place in accordance with 
the ‘rules of the game’ which inevitably foreclose 
certain outcomes, transitional politics, in seeking to 
fundamentally change the rules of the game, is subject 
to no such limitations”.
In contrast to TJ in authoritarian regimes or in ongo-
ing conflicts, measures of accountability can proceed and 
effect change without the very real possibility of being un-
dermined by arbitrary authoritarian whim or reversal on 
the battlefield. In the paradigmatic transition, the possibil-
ity for the army or previous regime to do this is severely 
weakened (Mendez, 1997, p. 11). This potential may be 
limited, contingent as it is on numerous conditions such as 
political will, funding and international support. Indeed, 
the history of TJ is blotched by the failure to realise the 
claims of its greatest advocates. However, a return to evalu-
ating TJ mechanisms primarily on the basis of how they 
work in situations where they can genuinely affect politi-
cal settlement for good or ill is a necessary step if we are 
to credibly assess their value in situations where resources 
are limited, foreign aid stretched and socio-political ar-
rangements under strain. TJ has a number of convenient 
fictions – that it can ‘heal’ those who have suffered rape and 
torture, that it can generate a publicly acceptable record of 
past abuse, that it can deter the savagery of war – but none 
is more convenient than labelling non-transitional circum-
stances as transitional to advocate or criticise the phenom-
enon. A back-to-basics focus on the paradigmatic transi-
tions is the clearest way for domestic governments and 
international donors to assess the very open question of 
whether the ever-increasing plethora of TJ mechanisms are 
the “centrepiece of democratic transition” (Orentlicher, 
2007, p. 15) or constitute a “costly luxury” (Mani, 2008, 
p. 253). Humanitarian projects that deal with past violence 
in undemocratic states and consolidated democracies are 
of course to be welcomed, but considering these actions 
as ‘transitional’ justice serves only to muddy the debate. A 
necessary step is to distinguish between TJ on the one hand 
and the application of the mechanisms traditionally associ-
ated with it on the other.  
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